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CASE COMMENTS
part of wisdom. ' 27 A better result will be reached if equity courts
enjoin criminal acts only when the existence of a public nuisance
is conclusively proven. When courts refuse to so limit themselves, the
only alternative is for the legislature to take action prohibiting
equity's intervention except when specifically authorized. Any other
course of action must lead to widespread injunctive law enforcement
and the corresponding injustices which will eventually cause the
courts to lose the respect of the public.
28
HUGH V. WHITE, JR.
IMPUTATION OF CHILD'S CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE TO PARENT
A father who allows his minor son to drive his car may find him-
self paying for the damages caused by his son's torts, either under the
family purpose doctrine or under statutes having similar effect. Some-
times, however, the negligent driving of both the son and a third
person results in a collision in which the father's car is damaged.
Should the contributory negligence of the son be imputed to the father
so as to bar a recovery by him from the negligent third person? This
question was recently presented to the Supreme Judicial Court of
-Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 171, 228 (1936).
-This danger becomes apparent when one examines the history of equity in
England. The Chancellor originally had jurisdiction to enjoin crimes, but as the
country became more settled, there was less need for the exercise of this power and
it finally ceased to exist in the fifteenth century. But the King's Council, which
had concurrent jurisdiction with the Chancellor, relinquished its jurisdiction more
slowly and continued to try criminal cases without a jury. This Council, which was
known as the Court of Star Chamber, became so arbitrary and tyrannical that it
was eventually abolished by statute in 1645. Mack, The Revival of Criminal Equity,
16 Harv. L. Rev. 389, 391 (19o3). "These abuses in the Court of Star Chamber
resulted in such ingrained distrust of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction without
a jury as to prevent the revival of criminal equity jurisdiction in England." Maloney,
Injunctive Law Enforcement: Leaven or Secret Weapon, i Mercer L. Rev. 1, 3
(1949). An early and apparently long-forgotten warning against such an exer-
cise of equity's power in this country was given by Chancellor Kent in 1817. Faced
with the problem of whether or not to enjoin a misdemeanor, the learned Chan-
cellor said: "The process of injunction is too peremptory and powerful in its ef-
fects to be used in such a case as this, without the dearest sanction. I shall better
consult the stability and utility of the powers of this Court, by not stretching them
beyond the limits prescribed by the precedents." Attorney Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co.,
2 Johns. Ch. R. 371, 391 (N.Y. 1817). But in the absence of an historical example of
the abuses which may be suffered, the advance of criminal equity in the United
States has met little opposition.
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Maine in York v. Day's Inc.' The court held that the contributory
negligence of the eighteen year old son-bailee would not be imputed
to the father and allowed the father to recover for the damages to his
car caused by the negligent third person.
At common law the negligence of a bailee was not imputed to the
bailor.2 Maine has changed this rule, to a certain extent, by a statute
providing that the owner of a motor vehicle shall be jointly and
severally liable with any minor under eighteen, whom the owner
knowingly permits to operate the vehicle, for any damages caused by
the negligence of the minor.3 The Maine court held that this statute
did not bar the father's recovery from the negligent third party, but
other jurisdictions have not reached the same conclusion.
The plight of the uncompensated victims of negligent and financial-
ly irresponsible drivers has led to the "family purpose" doctrine,4 under
which the owner who permits members of his household to drive his
automobile is regarded as making such family purpose his business, so
that the driver is treated as the car owner's servant.5 In some states not
having the family purpose doctrine, a similar liability has been im-
posed on car owners under "owner's consent" or "owner's responsibil-
ity" statutes that make the bailor of the automobile responsible for the
negligent acts of the bailee.
6
These statutes, although many of them are similar in phraseology,
have not always been construed to reach the same result. Thus, the
plaintiff-father in the principal case would have been granted or de-
nied a recovery depending largely upon a particular court's interpre-
tation of the statute. For example, some courts emphasize that the
statutes are in derogation of common law and should be strictly con-
strued, with the result that contributory negligence is not imputed to
the bailor;7 whereas others, noting that the statutes are remedial in
'153 Me. 441, 14o A.2d 730 (1958).
2James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 La. L. Rev. 340 (1954).
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 22, § 156 (1954): "Every owner of a motor vehicle
causing or knowingly permitting a minor under the age of 18 years to operate such
vehicle upon a highway, and any person who gives or furnishes a motor vehicle to
such minor, shall be jointly and severally liable with such minor for any damages
caused by the negligence of such minor in operating such vehicle."
This statute was previously construed to hold a bailor-father liable for the
negligence of his bailee-son, when the former was sued by an injured third party.
Strout v. Polakewich, 139 Me. 134, 27 A.2d 911 (1942).
42 Harper 9. James, Torts § 23.6 (1956).
I'Prosser, Torts § 66 (2d ed. 1955).
(James, supra note 2, at 350.
'westergren v. King, 48 Del. 158, 99 A.2d 356 (1953); Goochee v. Wagner, 232
App. Div. 401, 25o N.Y. Supp. 102 (4th Dep't 1931).
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nature, are inclined to construe them liberally and are therefore
prone to allow the imputation of contributory negligence.8
Three legislative purposes have been attributed to owner's consent
statutes: 9 (i) The statute places the financial responsibility upon a
person who is economically able to bear it.' ° As would seem probable,
the courts so holding generally refuse to impute contributory negli-
gence to the bailor, since the aim is to hold the bailor liable and not
to deny him recovery from a negligent third party. (2) The statute
removes the burden of proving agency, a prerequisite to the imputa-
tion of negligence under the common law.11 Courts emphasizing this
purpose also refuse to impute contributory negligence. (3) The statute
promotes highway safety, because the threat of being held respon-
sible for his driver's actions induces the owner to select his drivers
more carefully. 12 Courts following this rationale tend to impute the
driver's contributory negligence to the owner.
Perhaps the major factor giving rise to different interpretations of
owner's consent statutes is the difference in their phraseology. Gen-
erally speaking, there are three broad categories:
(i) Statutes providing that an owner is liable for the damage caused
by the negligence of a driver operating his car with his consent, and
which have an added provision that "the negligence of such person
[driver-bailee] shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil
damages."' 3 The wording of this type statute is clear, and the courts
have consistently held that the contributory negligence of the bailee
is imputed to the bailor when he is suing or being sued.14
sNational Trucking & Storage Co. v. Driscoll, 64 A.2d 304 (D.C. Munic. Ct.
App. 1949)-
"Notes, 17 Cornell L.Q. 158 (1931); Note, 27 N.D.L. Rev. 194 (1951).
"°Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, lo N.W.2d 4o6 (1943).
'Mills v. Gabriel, 259 App. Div. 6o, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78, So (2d Dep't 194o); Plaumbo
v. Ryan, 213 App. Div. 517, 20o N.Y. Supp. 225 (2d Dep't 1925).
1Baber v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 215 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954); National Truck-
ing & Storage Co. v. Driscoll, 64 A.2d 304, 308 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1949); Davis
Pontiac Co. v. Sirois, 82 R.I. 32, 1o5 A.2d 792 (1954).
'2 Cal. Vehicle Code § 402(a) (1937); Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 61o6 (1953).
2Birnbaum v. Blunt, 152 Cal. App. 2d 371, 313 P.2d 86 (1957); Fox v. Schuster,
50 Cal. App. 2d 362, 123 P.2d (1942); Milgate v. Wraith, 19 Cal. 2d 297, 121 P.2d
10 (1942).
The Delaware statute, supra note 13, as amended in 1953, contains the added
words "and the negligence of such minor shall be imputed to such owner or such
person for all purposes of civil damages," and therefore resembles the California
statute, supra note 13. Prior to this amendment, it closely resembled statutes of the
second category, infra note 15, especially the statute of Minnesota. In Westergren v.
King, 48 Del. 158, 99 A.2d 356 (1953), the Delaware court construed the State's
original statute as not imputing the contributory negligence of a minor-bailee to his
19591
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(2) Statutes that create an agency relation between the owner and
the driver, usually by providing that in case of an accident the driver
shall be deemed to be the agent of the owner. 15 This type of statute
has been interpreted in two different ways, each yielding a different
result. Minnesota, 16 on the one hand, refuses to impute the contribu-
tory negligence of the bailee to the bailor when the latter is a plain-
tiff. The District of Columbia 17 and Rhode Island,'8 on the other
hand, hold that such contributory negligence is to be imputed in all
cases. In light of a recent decision, the District of Columbia rule, im-
puting the contributory negligence of the bailee to the bailor in all
cases seems firmly entrenched. 9 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island
in Davis Pontiac Co. v. Sirois,20 construing the amended statute for the
first time, recognized the conflict between the holdings of the District
of Columbia and the Minnesota courts. The court found that the
statute more nearly resembled that of the District of Columbia and
imputed the operator's contributory negligence to the plaintiff-owner.
However, the Rhode Island statute is not applicable when the operator
is shown to be financially responsible; 21 furthermore, the statute is
father-bailor so as to bar the latter's recovery from a negligent third party-a result
in accord with the holdings of the Minnesota courts, infra note iG. This amended
statute has not been construed to date, but it is submitted that a result will be
reached imputing the contributory negligence of the bailee to the bailor when the
bailor is suing or being sued. A contrary result would render the amendment
meaningless.
"D.C. Code Ann. § 40-408 (1951); Minn. Stat. § 170.54 (1953); R.I. Pub. Laws, ch.
2595, § I (195o).
:1In Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711, 714 (1949), the court
stated: "IT]he driver causing an accident shall be deemed the owner's agent.., for
purposes only of holding the owner liable to persons injured by the driver's negli-
gence." Cf. Peters v. Boden, 242 Minn. 849, 65 N.W.2d 917 (1954); Christensen v.
Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, io N.W.2d 406 (1943).
"'The court stated the purpose of the District of Columbia statute was to provide
for financially responsible defendants and to promote more careful driving, with
emphasis on the latter. "Both of these purposes are served by imputing to the
owner the negligence of one driving with the owner's consent, in all circumstances,
whatever legal relationship between them." National Trucking & Storage Co. v. Dris-
coll, 64 A.2d 304, 3o8 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1949).
"Davis Pontiac Co. v. Sirois, 82 R.I. 32, 1o5 A.2d 792 (1954).
"Baber v. Akers Motor Lines, 215 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954), citing National
Trucking & Storage Co. v. Driscoll, 64 A.2d 3o4 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1949),
with approval and reaching the same result.
282 R.I. 32, 1o5 A.2d 792 (1954).
2lR.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 2595, § 1 (195o): "Whenever any motor vehicle shall be
used ... with the consent of the owner ... the operator... shall in case of accident,
be deemed to be the agent of the owner... unless such operator shall have furnished
evidence of financial responsibility ... "
[Vol. XVI
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couched in terms of owner's "liability. '22 By referring to the owner
as the "defendant," the Rhode Island Legislature clearly showed that
it did not intend the act to apply when the owner is suing as a plain-
tiff. It would appear, therefore, that the Rhode Island court reached
a result contrary to the manifest intent of the legislature.
23
(3) Statutes in the third group merely state that the owner of the
car shall be liable for the negligence of a person operating his car with
the owner's consent. The Maine statute falls within this group, closely
resembling the statutes of New York,24 Iowa,25 and Wisconsin.26
Although there is apparent conflict in the holdings of the lower
New York courts, 27 the New York rule is stated in Mills v. Gabriel2s
as being: "The statute does not change the common-law rule respect-
ing the owner's right to recover from third persons .... It is appli-
cable.., only in actions brought by third persons against the owner."29
Where a contrary result was reached, reliance was placed on the "both-
ways" doctrine,30 or the court, apparently confused by the fact that
both negligent drivers were bailees, decided it would be "absurd" to
award each bailor his damages against the other and drew nice dis-
tinctions from the wording of the statute to reach a decision the court
thought just.31 However, this so-called absurdity disappears when it is
considered that this would have been the result at common law, and
the purpose of the statute abrogating the common law in order to pro-
'2 The title of the Rhode Island statute is: "Civil Liability of Owners and
Operators of Motor Vehicles." Liability is usually used to express an obligation or
debt owned, certainly not to bar recovery. 53 C.J.S. Liability 17 (1948).
nSee an excellent dissenting opinion by Justice Condon in Davis Pontiac Co.
v. Sirois, 82 R.I. 32, 1o5 A.2d 792 (1954).
IN.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Laws § 59.
-5lowa Code Ann. § 321493 (1954).
Wis. Stat. § 85.o8(ia) (1937).
"'Annot. 1 A.L.R.2d 1437, 1441 (1950).
n 25 9 App. Div. 60, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78 (2d Dep't 194o).
-- 8 N.Y.S.2d at 8o.
3"If the negligence of the operator is imputable to the owner in actions by
third persons against the owner, the converse must also be true; that is, the negli-
gence of the operator will be imputable to the owner in actions by the owner
against third persons." Schuler v. Whitman, 138 Misc. 814, 246 N.Y. Supp. 528, 531-32
(Sup. Ct. 1930). For a discussion of the "both-ways" doctrine see note 39 infra and
accompanying text.
"Renza v. Brennan, 165 Misc. 96, 3oo N.Y. Supp. 221 (County Ct. 1937); Dar-
rohn v. Russell, 154 Misc. 753, 277 N.Y. Supp. 783 (Rochester City Ct. 1935). In
accord but decided on other grounds: Shuler v. Whitmore, Rauber & Vicinus, 233
App. Div. 892, 251 N.Y. Supp. 886 (4th Dep't 1931); Swarthout v. Van Auken, 227
App. Div. 644, 235 N.Y. Supp. 732 (4th Dep't 1929).
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vide financially able defendants is fulfilled by allowing each bailor to
recover his damages from the other.
The Iowa court overruled previous case law in Stuart v. Pilgrim32
by construing the Iowa statute as not imputing the contributory negli-
gence of the bailee to the bailor so as to bar the latter's recovery from
a negligent third person. Previous Iowa decisions had interpreted
the Iowa statute as creating a principal-agent relation between the
owner and the driver,33 and also had relied on the both-ways doctrine.
However, language indicating the creation of an agency relationship
is not contained in the statute, and the true legislative purpose, to pro-
vide a means of compensation for third parties injured in automobile
accidents, would seem to have been restored by the overruling case.
The Wisconsin statute, though similar to the Maine, New York,
and Iowa statutes, has been construed to reach a contrary result. In
Scheibe v. Town of Lincoln,34 the court held that the percentage of
the total negligence attributable to the driver would be imputed, under
the statute, to the owner when the owner was suing for damages to
his car. The wording of the statute does not, on its face, support this
imputation of contributory negligence both ways.3 5 However, it is
likely that this strained result may be attributed to Wisconsin's com-
parative negligence rule.36
Courts, such as those in Wisconsin, have attempted to justify the
imputation of contributory negligence of the bailee to the bailor un-
der the owner's consent statutes, when a statute is not clear in this
respect, on three main grounds:37 (1) the remedial nature of the
32247 Iowa 709, 74 N.W.2d 212 (1956).
3Denny v. Green, 224 Iowa 1268, 278 N.W. 285 (1938); Rogers v. Jefferson,
224 Iowa 324, 275 N.W. 874 (1937); Secured Fin. Co. v. Chicago, R.I.&P.R.R., 207
Iowa 1105, 224 N.W. 88 (1929).
'4223 Wis. 425, 271 N.W. 47 (1937).
3'Wis. Stat. § 85.08 (a) (1937) provides that the parent or guardian is responsible
"for any and all damages growing out of the negligent operation...." of a minor
vehicle by the minor.
"Wis. Stat. § 331.045 (1937) provides that any damages allowed shall be di-
minished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
recovering.
'Two other minor grounds have also been asserted by the courts and legal
writers.
If contributory negligence is not imputed to the owner when he is suing a
negligent third party, then car owners will place the car title in the name of the
family member who drives least, thereby circumventing the owner's consent statutes.
Reno, Imputed Contributory Negligence in Automobile Bailments, 82 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 213, 216 (1934). Should such circumstances arise, the remedy would be beyond
the power of the courts, but it is a fair assumption that legislatures will take appro-
priate action to effectuate fully the intended result of the statutes.
Under the consent statutes, if two bailees are involved in an accident and both
[Vol. XVI
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statute; (2) the purpose of the statute, to promote more careful driv-
ing; and (3) the both-ways doctrine.
The rule of construction that a remedial statute is to be construed
liberally should be resorted to only when the intent of the legislature
is in doubt. As pointed out by the Minnesota court: "The duty to
construe a remedial statute liberally simply means that the court
should so apply it as to suppress the mischief sought to be avoided by
affording the remedy intended."38 The primary remedy intended by
the owner's consent statutes is to provide financially responsible de-
fendants, so that innocent victims of automobile accidents will not be
left uncompensated. "The very reason for holding the consenting
owner liable for negligence of the operator of his automobile, that of
furnishing financial responsibility to an injured party, is completely
absent in the owner's action to recover for damages sustained by him
as a result of the concurrent negligence of the operator and the third
party."
39
If the court finds the purpose of the statute is to promote more
careful driving, it may be reasoned that the imputation of the contribu-
tory negligence of the bailee to the owner, so as to bar the owner's
recovery from a negligent third person, will encourage owners to se-
lect their drivers with greater care.4 0 However, it seems that the li-
bility which the statute imposes on the owner in case of his driver's
negligence is the strongest incentive toward a more careful selection
of drivers and that little is added by denying a recovery to the owner
in the case of a third party's negligence. The imputation of the bailee's
contributory negligence merely operates to allow a negligent third
party to escape liability.
The rationale of the both-ways doctrine is that a statute which
expressly changes the common law in one regpect, by imputing the
negligence of the bailee to the bailor, impliedly changes the common
law in another respect by imputing the contributory negligence of the
were negligent, then the bailors would be allowed to recover from each other.
This, it is said, becomes an unjust result when the value difference in the cars is
great. See the dissenting opinion in Gochee v. Wagner, 232 App. Div. 401, 250 N.Y.
Supp. 102, 107 (4th Dep't 1931); Reno, supra at 223; and 17 Cornell L. Q. 158, 165
(1931). However, under the law, the size of the recovery is governed by the amount
of the injury. This novel factual situation did arise in Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228
Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711 (1949), with the result that each bailor was compen-
sated for the negligence of his bailee, and each bailor recovered for damages to
his own car. The result seems both logical and equitable.
"Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, io N.W.2d 406, 416
(1943).
9o N.W.2d at 417.
'ODavis Pontiac Co. v. Sirois, 82 R1. 32, 105 A.2d 792 (1954).
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bailee to the bailor.41 However, if the legislature sees fit to impute the
negligence of the bailee to the bailor with a specific purpose in mind,
it does not necessarily follow that it also intends to burden the bailor
even further by imputing contributory negligence to him.42 The im-
putation of contributory negligence, by denying recovery to an in-
nocent bailor, represents a deviation from the principle of fault and
also tends to broaden the scope of the defense of contributory negli-
gence, a departure from the modern trend.43 A rule based on doubt-
ful logic and contrary to the public need of an expansion of liability
in the automobile accident cases is deserving of the criticism it has
earned.
44
Should the legislature want to give a statute the effect of imputing
negligence both ways, appropriate language is available.45 When the
legislative intent is not dearly expressed to impute negligence both
ways, it would be advisable to avoid the creation of such a result by
judicial legislation. The Supreme Court of Maine in the principal
case refused judicially to legislate such a rule and applied sound
judicial reasoning that might well be adopted by courts faced with
the same problem in the future.
NICHOLAS H. RODPIGUEZ
41The both-ways doctrine is embodied in the Restatement of Torts: "[A]
plaintiff is barred from recovery by the negligent act or omission of a third person
if... the relation between them is such that the plaintiff would be liable as a de-
fendant for harm caused to another by such negligent conduct of the third person."
Restatement, Torts § 485 (1934)-
"Note, 17 Cornell L. Q. 158, 164 (1931).
"Prosser, Laws of Torts 296 (2d ed 1955).
"The both-ways doctrine has been severely criticized by the courts and legal
writers. Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, io N.W.2d 4o6, 416
(1943); 2 Harper & James, Torts 1274 (1956); Gregory, The Contributory Neg-
ligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for Loss of Services, 2 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 173, 177-78 (1935); Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Neg-
ligence, 41 Yale L.J. 831, 843 (1932); James, supra note 2, at 351; Note, 17 Cornell
L.Q 158, 165 (191).11See the present Delaware statutory amendment, supra note 14.
